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Abstract
The article analyses Mozambique’s post-conflict democratisation and argues 
that Mozambique has become a ‘managed democracy’ in the new period. 
Mozambique is viewed by the donor community and multilateral institutions, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as a success 
story of post-war reconstruction and used as a model to be emulated. The 
article traces the trajectory of democratisation under the auspices of a liberal 
peace theoretical framework which was agreed upon in the General Peace 
Agreement ending the conflict in 1992. Secondary quantitative data were 
made available from leading International Organisations such as the World 
Bank and the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index. The article found that, despite 
Mozambique’s commitments to build an inclusive democracy, corruption 
unmasks Mozambique’s success story. The authors conclude that democratic 
consolidation has been accompanied by extractive political and economic 
institutions leading to a disgruntled citizenry. The country’s peace agreement 
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remains fragile, and faces the reality that political stability has not been 
accompanied by social justice, equity and deepening democratisation.
Introduction
Since the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, which 
ended conflict1 and tumult, Mozambique has gone through convoluted 
political trajectories casting doubt on whether democracy has been salvaged. 
This article asks the question whether democratic reforms in Mozambique’s 
post-conflict period, since the end of the civil war in 1992, have led to an 
inclusive democracy. The article suggests that Mozambique has become a 
‘managed democracy’2 cognizant of the manipulation of political, economic 
and social institutions by Mozambique’s governing elite. Scholars like Hanlon 
(2008) and Pitcher (2002) have argued that Mozambique has struggled to 
salvage nascent democratic institutions that promote inclusive political and 
economic institutions as envisaged by international stakeholders since the 
signing of the GPA. The negotiations that led to the end of the conflict in the 
post-Cold War period, under the auspices of a liberal agenda, coincided with 
the Third Democratic Wave (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Huntington 
1991). According to Huntington (1991:15), a wave of democratisation refers to 
‘a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur 
1 A ceasefire was agreed upon in 1992, which led to the holding of the 1994 democratic 
and peaceful elections and to FRELIMO’s victory. However, RENAMO has subsequently 
violated the terms of the GPA. In the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections, 
disputes arose between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The ruling party was accused of 
manipulating votes and lacking transparency, leading RENAMO to complain about 
the ballot counting rules. Although electoral reforms emphasised transparency and 
allowed the participation of electoral observers, RENAMO felt that the reforms had 
been manipulated to suit the continued dominance of FRELIMO. This was preceded by 
RENAMO’s boycott of the local elections in 1998. The antagonism resurfaced during the 
general election and culminated in RENAMO’s renouncing and violation of the GPA. 
Since mid-2013 RENAMO resorted to sporadic violent attacks and threats to capture key 
infrastructure projects. Violent clashes were initially limited to a small geographical area 
in Sofala. According to some media reports there have now been clashes in the provinces 
of Nampula and Inhambane, and armed members of RENAMO have more recently been 
seen in Tete (AllAfrica.com 2012, 2013).
2 For an expanded view of what a managed democracy entails, see Nikolai Petrov 2005, and 
the next section below.
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within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions 
in the opposite direction during that period’.
Mozambique’s transition towards democracy occurred in parallel with regional 
and global trends towards a quest for a ‘New African Democracy’ across the 
continent to define the socio-political reality of most Africans. At the regional 
level, the end of protracted regional conflicts in South Africa and Namibia 
instilled hope that democracy was a viable option in post-conflict settlements. 
While the international community marvelled at these transitions, fault lines 
and limitations in peacekeeping became evident in Rwanda and Somalia: 
enmity and mass atrocities, genocide and ethnic cleansing of millions of people 
(Zartman 1995; Dallaire 2004; Melvern 2000; Desforges 1999). In addition, the 
horrors of Srebrenica in the Balkans further highlighted institutional limitations 
in post Second World War ‘peace’ decades (Zartman 1995; Huntington 1991). 
Mozambique’s democratic transition was agreed upon in a century that most 
commentators have labelled as the bloodiest. Undoubtedly, the agreement of 
peace by conflicting parties sought to restore a belief in democratic institutions 
and the relevance of the United Nations (UN).
The signing of the GPA between FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, 
or Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and RENAMO (Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana, or Mozambican National Resistance) in 1992, heralded 
a new era in Mozambican politics, from pariah under Scientific Socialism to 
‘successful’ peace agreement as observed by international policy makers (Phiri 
2012). Similarly, scholars and practitioners labelled Mozambique a ‘beacon of 
hope’ and a ‘model’ that can be emulated in post-conflict societies across the 
world for building constitutional democracies after a peace agreement (Collier 
et al. 2005; Paris 2004), and to show evidence of upholding human rights, 
gender equality, free market economics, rule of law, fair political process – 
bringing succour to the poor and excluded. These suggestions have been made 
after experimentation with political and economic reforms under the auspices 
of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank (Collier et al. 2005; Paris 2004; Phiri 2012). The results 
of these reforms are also noted by several unilateral and multilateral agencies 
and organisations (World Bank 2014; UNICEF 2010). This article critically 
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discusses the challenges, and contestations of inclusive democratic governance 
in post-conflict Mozambique.
The article adopts different conceptual frameworks to Mozambique’s 
democratic transition, cognizant that one framework is not adequate to explain 
the characterisation of Mozambique as a ‘managed democracy’. The article 
firstly discusses democratic peace as expounded by the father of Peace Studies, 
Johan Galtung, to contextualise the quest for peace when conflict raged in 
Mozambique. The article alternates emphasis between the conceptualisation of 
a ‘New Democracy in Africa’ as articulated by the Pan-Africanist Archie Mafeje, 
locating Mozambique’s quest for inclusive democracy within continental 
debates; and Acemoglu and Robinson’s take on inclusive political institutions 
or lack thereof as a sine qua non to intrinsic freedom that promotes inclusive 
democracy. It also provides a brief discussion of a managed democracy. What 
emerges is the narrative of a country that has risen from the ravages of civil 
war to attain respectable economic growth and governance levels. The article 
argues that Mozambique still has a fragile peace agreement and a questionable 
democracy which has to cope with the rise of public discontent and outrage 
over election results and issues pertaining to the improvement of the socio-
economic condition of ordinary Mozambicans. Factors, such as FRELIMO’s 
dominance over state affairs, its little openness to dialogue with the opposition, 
and the non-existent distinction between the ruling party and state apparatus, 
debilitate the salvaging of democratic institutions and the development of an 
inclusive democracy.
Democratic Peace and New African Democracy: 
Conceptual frameworks
With the end of the Cold War, military threats that polarised the world, 
predicating a cataclysmic end, had diminished. The narrow view of security of 
the Cold War was replaced by a number of proposals for an extended security 
concept. Security no longer encompassed only territorial contestation and a 
Machiavellian notion of the survival of states in the international order, but 
all threats to humanity. Democratic governance and human security gained 
momentum, becoming relevant in a number of fields, including: terrorism, 
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systemic violations of human rights, organised crime, violence against women, 
epidemics, food supplies, natural disasters and environmental disasters 
(Akerlund 2001:34). 
Johan Galtung made a seminal contribution in the field by maintaining an 
emphasis on human security and further differentiating direct and structural 
violence. He suggests that the ideas of citizenship, equality, freedom, and justice 
are more directed against structural violence, at the expense of or in addition 
to being directed against direct violence (Galtung 1986:4). Mozambique’s 
conflict bequeathed a legacy of blight, neglect and poverty as a result of direct 
and structural violence by the perpetrators. Any conceptual framework that 
seeks to explain Mozambique’s governance challenges needs to be cognizant of 
a commitment to building democratic institutions in the post-conflict era in 
an African context, with the absence of violence. As Galtung (1986:7) suggests:
Liberal theory with its political expression as democracy and its economic 
expression as capitalism claims peace as an automatic consequence once 
that theory has been implemented in all societies in the world, with the 
human rights approach as one special case. Correspondingly, Marxist 
theory with its political expression in democratic centralism and economic 
expression in socialism has the same claim, as does also anarchist theory 
with its emphasis on the withering away of the state, today.
For this newly emerged post-conflict state, paying attention to the realities of 
poverty, inequality and social exclusion could not be divorced from building 
new institutions to salvage an inclusive democracy. The conundrum is: Why, 
under the auspices of a liberal peace agreement in Mozambique, was the 
expected outcome of a liberal democracy not attained? In this context, Archie 
Mafeje, the renowned South African Pan-Africanist, argued that while liberal 
democracy upholds the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, it 
does not address the question of social equity (Mafeje 2002:11). The ideals 
best expressed to suit the African condition, social reality and psyche should be 
rooted in the democratic contestations seeking to address the human conditions 
of most citizens in Mozambique. In this paper, therefore, Mafeje’s emphasis 
compensates where Galtung views only a peace agreement accompanied by 
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a liberal democracy. As Mafeje (2002:11) further argues, liberal democracy is 
severely handicapped because the theory of laissez-faire on which it is founded 
obliges it to accept such phenomena as poverty and social inequality among 
citizens and nations as a natural outcome of the right of the individual to 
choose.
Mafeje’s lenses of a ‘New African Democracy’ could potentially shape a 
progressive debate and dialogue on the quest of inclusive democracy in 
Mozambique. Mafeje had the following principles in mind in his articulation 
of a ‘New African Democracy’: firstly, the sovereignty of the people should be 
recognised as both a basic necessity and a fundamental right. Secondly, social 
justice, not simply formal rights, should constitute the foundation of the new 
democracy. Thirdly, the livelihood of citizens should not be contingent on 
ownership of property but on equitable access to productive resources (Mafeje 
2002:12).
In retrospect, Mafeje’s concept of a ‘sovereign democracy’ could be misconstrued 
to tolerate implicit and explicit human rights abuses that pseudo-democracies 
and authoritarian governments across the continent have championed. 
‘Managed democracy’ can better be understood in light of the evolution of a 
’sovereign democracy’ in contemporary global politics and more specifically 
Russian politics.3 Sovereign democracy can be the negative brand name for 
managed and centralised political development, and can be considered to be 
the highest (and last?) stage of a managed democracy (Petrov 2005:181). In 
the African context for example, while post-genocide Rwanda has witnessed 
the building of stable institutions, civil liberties are curtailed, and opposition 
3 Since his ascension as Russia’s president in 2000, Vladimir Putin has rotated roles as 
President and Prime Minister. He previously served as President from 2000 to 2008 and 
as Prime Minister of Russia from 1999 to 2000 and again from 2008 to 2012. During 
that last term as Prime Minister, he was also the Chairman of the United Russia political 
party. Under his covert and overt leadership he has influenced the Kremlin to promulgate 
political reforms and other moves, thereby increasing management by nondemocratic 
means, while trying at the same time to deflect critics with his slogan of ‘sovereign 
democracy’. These changes include electoral reform, a tightening of control over political 
parties and civil society, the appointment of governors instead of their direct election, and 
also a number of youth, media, and public relations projects.
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politics deem suspicious, challenging the narrative of an inclusive democracy. 
In a similar vein, while voters have chosen preferred candidates in Zimbabwean 
elections since 2000, media abuse and a clientelistic government have justified the 
use of force and curtailed press freedoms in the name of ‘sovereign democracy’. 
This approach does not move away from the wave of post-independence 
authoritarian regimes that championed the toothless Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), which sought to safeguard the ‘sovereignty of nations’ over the 
human rights discourse across the African continent (Cooper 2002; Phiri 2014). 
Managed democracies however, contradict the principles of both a liberal and 
a social democracy (Wolin 2008). They feature a strong presidency with weak 
institutions, state control of the media, control over elections in order to prevent 
elites from delegitimising their decisions, visible short-term effectiveness and 
long-term inefficiency (Petrov 2005:182). In this light inclusive democracy 
as presented in a linear liberal or social democratic framework should not 
be understood as a universal value, which feeds into the Western narrative of 
bravado and triumphalism after the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama 1992). 
Mafeje’s theoretical framework helps to imagine pluralversalism, which is 
reflected in decoloniality. In decoloniality, African democracies are given the 
chance to give meaning to their future political trajectories without being 
burdened by the West’s conceptualisation of what an inclusive democracy should 
be – cognizant of the paralysis and/or opportunities that exist in the modern 
or postmodern narrative of building institutions. Further, in striving for social 
justice, Mafeje proposes the development of strong democratic institutions 
to safeguard pluralism and democratic citizenship when these are distortedly 
conceptualised and truncated in emerging African democracies, including 
Mozambique. Mafeje’s ideas, though located in a different theoretical tradition, 
are not much different from what Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s 
(2012) seminal work concludes – that political and economic institutions are a 
sine qua non for progress towards pluralistic societies.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:81) argue that ‘extractive political institutions 
concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and place few constraints 
on the exercise of this power’. Following Robert Michels’ (1962) thesis on 
‘the iron law of oligarchy’, Acemoglu and Robinson build on this argument by 
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further stating that ‘economic institutions are often structured by the elite to 
extract resources from the rest of society. Crucial to point out, these extractive 
economic institutions naturally accompany extractive political institutions’ 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012:81). Mafeje’s ideas converge with Acemoglu 
and Robinson as they stress the importance of democratic centralism to foster 
inclusive democratic polities. Though from different theoretical traditions, 
these theorists agree that the monopoly of power and force by the state and state 
institutions debilitate the intrinsic values of freedom that work toward inclusive 
governance and democratic polities. In this light, these conceptual frameworks 
cannot be divorced from each other and the paper will analyse Mozambique’s 
democratic trajectory. 
Mozambique’s quest for inclusive democracy from the 
conflict to the post-conflict phase
Mozambique emerged from a protracted liberation war (1964-74) that was 
fought to oust Portuguese colonialism, and was immediately plunged into 
a civil war in 1977. The first attacks by RENAMO were reported soon after 
independence in 1977, the year when FRELIMO transitioned from a liberation 
movement to a Marxist-Leninist party (Manning 2002). Under Samora Machel’s 
leadership, Mozambique implemented scientific socialism to modernise the 
society, but the war debilitated socio-economic progress (Hanlon and Smart 
1990; Vines 1994, 1991). Politically, FRELIMO maintained a monopoly of 
power and force in state and society, as Giovanni Carbone (2003:4) importantly 
highlights:
The Leninist notion of a vanguard single party, with restricted membership 
and party primacy over the state, implied a decision to do away with 
opposition political organizations and thus the latter’s repression.
The war, coupled with economic collapse internally, led to the demise of the 
Socialist project, particularly in the second half of the 1980s.What was even 
more pressing than restoring socialism was the need for peace, as repeatedly 
stressed by Samora Machel (Arndt 1999:6; Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). 
The conflict led to the destruction of infrastructure and fundamental pillars 
of development such as schools, hospitals and farmland, which opened the 
45
Mozambique’s peace decades since the end of the conflict
doors to food insecurity, widespread disease, illiteracy and hunger (Hanlon 
1990). Poverty also deepened during the armed conflict years. Under dire 
circumstances, Mozambique sought support from international financial 
institutions (IFIs), which marked a gradual abandonment of FRELIMO’s 
initial Marxist-Leninist ideology. Between 1984 and 1990 the FRELIMO 
government was in talks with RENAMO to end the conflict, and also embarked 
on constitutional reforms working towards Mozambique’s democratisation 
(Macuane 2009). The year 2012 marked the 20th anniversary of the GPA that 
was signed between FRELIMO led by Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO leader 
Afonso Dhlakama. The same year held a great deal of importance for FRELIMO 
and the future of Mozambican politics as it signalled the 50th anniversary of the 
country’s sole liberation movement and the occurrence of its 10th Congress. 
RENAMO and the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (locally known as 
Movimento Democratico de Moçambique or MDM),4 an important emerging 
political party that has gained momentum in the Mozambican political scene 
since its inception in March of 2009, are the only significant challengers of 
FRELIMO’s electoral dominance and are therefore in a position to strengthen 
nascent democratic institutions.
Various explanations are given on how Mozambique was able to move from 
a bitter conflict to democratisation. Some scholars and practitioners point to 
the international context and the role played by United Nations Operations in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ). This position credits the United Nations (UN) with 
having played a central role because it was willing to contribute a large number 
of peacekeeping troops and financial resources to manage demobilisation 
and elections in Mozambique. The UN operation in Mozambique cost $700 
million and involved 6 239 troops. Barbara Walter (1999), in particular, 
writes that the presence of a large UN force presented a credible commitment 
that the provisions of the peace accord would be held. Yet focusing solely 
on the United Nations ignores the complexities that made the GPA a fragile 
agreement. As Walter (1999:150) points out: ‘The political guarantees gave 
RENAMO confidence that it would challenge the government, the military 
4 The MDM is a RENAMO breakaway party that emerged in 2009. It currently has 8 seats in 
parliament and leads four municipalities.
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guarantee made RENAMO feel safe, and the territorial guarantees of a dual 
administration prevented RENAMO’s obsolescence’. Dennis Jett, former United 
States ambassador to Mozambique during the implementation period, reflects 
that a more complete operation would entail that the UN remains behind to 
build political institutions.5
Other scholars and practitioners suggest that weak internal and external 
resources and support for Mozambique’s conflict at the time helped to bring the 
war to an end and cause a political settlement to ensue (Zartman 1995; Msabaha 
1995; Paris 2004). On the other hand, David Hume (1994:144) argues that 
‘[t]he international factors affecting the conflict became favourable to a 
settlement, and President Mugabe, once FRELIMO’s comrade-in-arms, 
eventually became the senior statesman supporting the peace process’. Yet this 
view also widens a chasm which prevents understanding the transition. Dorina 
Bekoe (2008:26) argues differently, trying to bridge the gap and offering a 
new perspective on the Mozambican political settlement. She notes that both 
positions miss the essence of the implementation period in Mozambique by not 
drawing out the mechanisms by which the parties continued to negotiate with 
each other in the absence or weakness of institutions.
If a peaceful political settlement was a quintessential position that both 
parties were aspiring towards, this merits close examination with particular 
reference to post-conflict democratisation. Indeed, how did RENAMO, a 
guerrilla movement best known both inside and outside of Mozambique as an 
organisation ‘without a political program’,6 sustained by external support and 
an army of captives, complete its transformations into a political party in time 
for the country’s first multiparty elections and agree to a negotiated settlement? 
While Hume (1994:144) marvels at the fact that the conflicting parties 
‘throughout the peace process, emphasised that their goal was reconciliation 
among Mozambicans as peace could not be built on the basis of a victory of 
5 In a telephone interview (26 September 2001) with Dorina A. Bekoe (referred to in 
Bekoe 2008).
6 Roland Paris (2004) notes that RENAMO aimed to undermine the FRELIMO government, 
but beyond that goal, it lacked a political programme and received little encouragement 
from the population within Mozambique. 
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one party over the other’, this position is contested. Hume (1994:144) notes that 
‘RENAMO showed dissatisfaction on a number of critical points’. The nature 
of dissatisfaction is articulated by Brazão Mazula, who notes that despite the 
desire of peace from both FRELIMO and RENAMO, it was marked by mistrust 
that was 
… [e]normous and reciprocal, but it came very strongly from RENAMO 
which did not want to fall into the trap of integration … the strategy 
through which FRELIMO had wanted for years to assimilate RENAMO 
[offering amnesty to those subduing to the government] not giving it any 
political worth (Mazula 1996:30).
Dhlakama, the RENAMO leader, pushed to create a government of national 
unity highlighting how losers would be treated in the new system. Bekoe 
(2008:28) further suggests that it was one thing for the GPA to state that 
Mozambique would use a system of proportional representation or permit 
RENAMO to hold on to some of its territory, however, this did not mean that 
RENAMO would be able both to influence policy and prevent adverse policies. 
Bekoe disagrees with the position that asserts that democratisation was simply 
influenced by international factors and internal weak structures. She suggests 
that this position ‘takes the provisions of the GPA for granted and does not assess 
the degree of mutual political and military vulnerability that characterized the 
implementation period’ (Bekoe 2008:28). 
The peace agreement provided a platform where democratic contestations 
could be forged. The strength of the GPA, as Bekoe (2008:29) suggests, ‘lies in 
the political reform that recognizes RENAMO as a legitimate political party 
and the adoption of electoral and administrative rules that allow it to exist as 
an effective political party’. However, as Chris Alden (2006:156) has argued, this 
has resulted in democratic elections being tied to a structure that favours the 
ruling party in power and, as has become clearer with each election, allowed 
FRELIMO to conduct domestic and foreign policy without any reference to 
opposition concerns. As Carbone (2005:428) highlighted, although ‘a formal 
separation of state and party structures was introduced in 1990–91’, the state 
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apparatus remains largely controlled by FRELIMO. Carbone (2005:429) 
succinctly substantiates this notion by asserting that
the majority of state personnel still belong to FRELIMO and thus, while 
state and party structures are now parallel rather than overlapping, the 
separation is largely an artificial one: to become real, it will have to wait 
until a different party takes power.
The Peace Agreement in Mozambique opened a new opportunity for democratic 
governance to be enhanced. During the Cold War period, Western governments 
supported authoritarian regimes that repressed people in order to promote 
geo-strategic interests (Klein 2007; Zartman 1995; Msabaha 1995; Huntington 
1991). Hanlon and Smart (2008:96) have argued that ‘FRELIMO is almost 
unique in its post-independence ability to stay totally organizationally united 
and yet remain so diverse on key issues’. This is a move that can be traced to the 
succession of leadership within FRELIMO party structures. After Mondlane’s 
death, Samora Machel legitimately ascended to power. In 1986, when Samora 
Machel died, Joaquim Chissano came to power in a move that ensured that 
party structures were open to the fluidity and mobility of leadership within 
FRELIMO. According to Hanlon and Smart (2008:96), corruption and nepotism 
are deeply entrenched in party structures. They suggest the following:
During elections, party workers are always shocked at the way corruption 
antagonizes voters and traditional FRELIMO supporters. Honest members 
and leaders stayed within the party and opted for internal reform, which 
led to Chissano being ousted as party leader and presidential candidate 
…. Yet Chissano remains in the party, on the Political Commission, and 
powerful. The other side of the coin is that some of Chissano’s notoriously 
corrupt allies also remain in the party, in some cases with well-paid 
sinecures, and with the justice system manipulated to ensure that they are 
never prosecuted. 
This does not, however, mean that democratic practice has been entrenched. 
Party members called for reform in the 2004 election, which led to Joaquim 
Chissano being replaced as party leader and presidential candidate. This 
was manifested in debates in which the old guard has been highly critical 
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of FRELIMO as a corrupt political party. As previously pointed out, in 
Mozambique, however, there was distrust mixed with uncertainty about the 
political future being agreed upon. Whereas the philosophy that underpinned 
the peace deal was conciliatory, Brazão Mazula (1996:32) argues that the ‘GPA 
sought to avoid the re-establishment of authoritarian regimes which tend to 
forget history and distort its analysis’. 
Initial prospect of inclusive democracy turned into a myth 
The theoretical contexts in this paper have revolved around Democratic Peace 
and the quest for a ‘New Democracy in Africa’ committed to social justice and 
equality as articulated by Mafeje. These frameworks push us further to imagine 
an inclusive democracy which exists to serve the interests of citizens. In the 
Mozambican case, both Cabaço and Mazula suggest that the Assembly of the 
Republic is the only possible forum for sharing power with the opposition. 
However with FRELIMO holding two-thirds of the seats in parliament, 
RENAMO and MDM remain too politically weak to influence the legislature. 
FRELIMO’s political supremacy at the Assembly of the Republic accentuates 
its grip on policy processes and guarantees that the ruling party continues to 
have substantial discretionary power over state affairs. To the detriment of the 
opposition, all top public officials are from the ruling party. In fact, in order 
to get promotions in the public service or rise up to influential positions in 
government, one must be politically affiliated with FRELIMO and show loyalty 
towards the party (Macuane 2012a). Therefore, at all levels of the state apparatus, 
decision making must be in alignment with the political agenda of FRELIMO 
(Macuane 2012a). In the same vein, Manning (2002) notes that Mozambique’s 
governance structures are dominated by ruling oligarchs.
Constitutional advancements have also allowed for the emergence of civil society 
organisations, which remain substantially deficient due to dominant party 
control and lack of funds (Forquilha and Orre 2011). Although civil society 
organisations participate in formal consultation processes, their limited technical 
capacity to operate as a solid network and relevant actors in policy-making 
processes further weaken their role as contributors to political inclusiveness 
(Macuane 2012b). According to Instituto Nacional de Estatística de Moçambique 
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(National Institute of Statistics of Mozambique 2004/2005:61), 71.2% of funds 
received by civil society were sourced from foreign donors. Similarly to the state, 
civil society organisations in Mozambique depend tremendously on foreign 
assistance for their daily operations, creating a great deal of susceptibility towards 
their donors’ agendas. In addition, much of the leadership in Mozambican 
associations and non-governmental organisations either comes from the public 
sector or is directly linked to FRELIMO (AfriMAP 2009). This shows that civil 
society continues to face serious challenges in promoting real participation of 
the citizenry in the formulation of public policies that will ultimately affect 
the masses.
The results produced by MDM at the polls during the 2013 municipal elections 
are worthy of mention. As of early 2014, the MDM is leading four municipalities, 
including three of the most populated and most important cities in the country, 
namely Beira, Quelimane and Nampula. The MDM candidate for the capital 
city Maputo obtained 42% of the vote next to FRELIMO’s 58%. These are 
significant changes reinforcing the idea that the MDM is gaining momentum 
as an opposition party and causing some shifts in power dynamics, particularly 
at the local level. MDM announced that Daviz Simango, the mayor of Beira, 
will, once more, be the candidate for the October presidential elections. MDM’s 
victories in the municipal elections boosted the party’s credibility as a strong 
opposition and will be potentially translated into more votes for the presidential 
elections. In spite of these important changes, FRELIMO continues to be the 
dominant political force on the national stage.
Managed democracy and absence of social justice?
Party domination over state affairs has always been the Achilles’ heel of 
Mozambican democratisation. According to theorists on party domination, 
the tendency of such systems is to allow the ruling party to spread its wings to 
the extent that opposition parties get weaker from election to election; thereby 
creating a certain degree of arrogance from the party, and oftentimes reducing 
voter turnout (Rønning 2010:8). In Mozambique, since the first elections in 
1994, voter turnout has been decreasing significantly. It went from 87% in 1994, 
to 67% in 1999 and 40% in 2004 (AfriMAP 2009). This may be partly attributed 
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to a few factors such as the distance from certain rural settlements to electoral 
posts, and also the general elections coinciding with floods which impeded many 
rural communities from participating. There is, nonetheless, dissatisfaction from 
the citizenry over the fact that power, and therefore control over policy as well 
as economic and political institutions, lies in the hands of a few. According to a 
report on democracy and political participation in Mozambique by AfriMAP, a 
programme of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), (2009), 
calling Mozambique a stable democratic government is a grave misjudgement 
so long as power continues to be increasingly exercised by one dominant party. 
In what concerns access to the media and other channels of social communication 
in the public domain, opposition parties face significant restrictions and 
there is still some censorship over debates about Mozambique’s political life 
(AfriMAP2009). Mozambique’s civil society does not yet play an important role 
in discussions between the government and the donor community due to its 
lack of substantial funding and coordinating capacity to address such issues. 
Lack of access to the press and a conveniently dormant civil society reinforce 
the ruling party’s dominance, hamper Mozambique’s democratisation and 
disable important processes aimed at achieving social justice and equality as 
highlighted by Mafeje’s ‘New Democracy in Africa’.
Democratic Peace since the GPA is another questionable issue that deserves 
particular attention. In the post-GPA period, Mozambique was often portrayed 
as an exceptional African story where political violence did not occur and 
where the overall population did not demonstrate any hostility towards its 
government. There have been a series of incidents that counter this narrative 
of peaceful post-conflict democratisation. In 2000, RENAMO supporters who 
protested against FRELIMO and the 1999 election results died of asphyxiation 
in a state police cell in the Cabo Delgado district of Montepuez (AfriMAP 
2009). The FRELIMO government was not held accountable for these atrocious 
acts. In 2005, citizens were killed, injured and houses destroyed during a 
protest on the outcome of the 2005 municipal elections in Mocimboa da Praia 
(AfriMAP 2009). In September of 2010, Maputo and Matola city were home to 
massive protests due to increases in food and transportation costs. Protestors 
were shot and beaten by state police. A year later, a large group of marginalised 
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ex-combatants protested before the Council of Ministers for pension reviews 
and social justice. No substantial attention was given to their plight. In January 
of 2012, populations resettled by the government and the coal mining giant 
Vale, a novel player in Mozambique’s resource battle, blocked the railway that 
connected the coal mining plant to the Beira port as a protest for the dire 
conditions in which they were left. The protestors were brutally battered and 
removed by state forces.
In 2012, Dhlakama relocated to ‘Saturjira’, RENAMO’s former wartime 
headquarters in Gorongosa, and threatened to return to violence, claiming 
that the government was ‘robbing’ Mozambique’s resources (AllAfrica.com 
2012). The Mozambican armed forces surrounded the headquarters, which 
led to accusations by RENAMO that FRELIMO leaders were planning to 
assassinate Dhlakama. This resulted in a wave of retaliatory attacks between the 
Mozambique armed forces and RENAMO armed forces, and a bold statement 
by the RENAMO leader openly declaring the end of the 1992 Peace Accord. 
There have been several rounds of talks between the FRELIMO-led government 
and RENAMO, which have not been successful in halting the politico-military 
tension in the country as the violence was not on the agenda of the discussions 
(Green and Otto 2014).
Retrospectively, the FRELIMO government used the platform to discuss issues 
revolving around RENAMO’s concerns over electoral reform and its desire to be 
represented in electoral bodies such as the National Electoral Commission (Green 
and Otto 2014). These talks did not deter RENAMO’s tactic of political isolation 
in the 2013 municipal elections and all other government processes as a protest 
against FRELIMO’s monopoly over Mozambique politics and the management 
of natural resources (Green and Otto 2014). The response of the government to 
the aforementioned crises accentuates the notion of a ‘managed democracy’, and 
further distances Mozambique’s democratisation from the inclusive democracy 
that it has come to embody ever since the GPA. In a ‘managed democracy’ there 
is a huge dissonance between the theoretical underpinnings of a democratic 
society on paper; and the rhetoric of social change that is supposed to safeguard 
citizens’ rights and promote social justice, pluralism and equality as articulated 
by Mafeje, Galtung, and Acemoglu and Robinson.
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Extractive political and economic institutions: Corruption, 
nepotism and residual forces in a pseudo-democracy 
The legal successions between presidents have certainly reinforced democratic 
practice in Mozambique. Nevertheless, FRELIMO has been highly criticised 
as a corrupt political party; which further culminated in the assassination 
of journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2001. Cardoso had been a fierce critique of 
Chissano’s privatisation policies, and exposed murky dealings with FRELIMO’s 
ruling elite and the private banking sector (Hanlon and Mosse 2010; Hanlon 
2001). According to Hanlon (2008), corruption and nepotism are deeply 
entrenched in party structures. In spite of having experienced the first decade 
of ‘successful’ peace and pluralistic politics, this relatively unruffled surface 
of Mozambican politics masks serious weaknesses. In light of this, Manning 
(2002:13) asserts:
For FRELIMO, over the years a weakened emphasis on ideology has 
facilitated the spread of corruption within the party and has hurt the party’s 
image in the eyes of the Mozambican citizens. With the creep of corruption 
the party has lost one of the things that made it distinctive in the eyes of the 
Mozambican citizens, whether party supporters or not. 
Figure 1 below,  illustrates that corruption in Mozambique has been on the 
increase when aggregated sectorally. Although the figure positively shows that 
accountability and transparency in the public sector may have been improving 
between 2000 and 2011 as the value stood slightly over 60, there are questionable 
results. This is unmasked by the fluctuation of values between 25 and 43 in the 
‘Corruption and bureaucracy’ label between 2000 and 2011. No change is noticed 
in the sector ‘Corruption in the rural areas’ culminating in an ‘Accountability’ 
value that has averaged a meagre 41 between 2000 and 2011. Corruption has 
been the result of governance malaise, challenging the narrative of Mozambique 
as a successful democratiser. Mozambique’s overall governance score was 53 
on the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2012) and ranked 21st which put it in 
the upper quintile of performance. When clustered with Southern African 
countries, which according to the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2012) are the 
least corrupt, then Mozambique’s corruption is well camouflaged. In the IIAG 
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2013 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2013) overall governance performance stands at 
number 20 and slightly worse off than neighbouring countries Malawi (16th), 
Tanzania (17th) and Zambia (12th). The only regional neighbour that is worse 
off is the ‘inverted totalitarianism’ Swaziland, ranked 26th. South Africa is ranked 
the highest at number 5. What the overall score does is to conceal its sectoral 
performance in terms of accountability and transparency as shown in the 
table below.  
Figure 1: Mozambique’s corruption indexes 2000–2011
Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2012.
The anatomy of corruption in Mozambique can be traced to extractive political 













0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0
Accountability
Accountability, Transparency and 
Corruption in the Public Sector
Accountability, Transparency and 
Corruption in the Public Sector (AfDB)
Accountability, Transparency and 
Corruption in the Public Sector (WB)
Accountability, Transparency and 
Corruption in the Rural Areas 
Corruption and Bureaucracy
Accountability of Public Offi cials
Corruption in Government and 
Public Offi cials







Mozambique’s peace decades since the end of the conflict
from authoritarian rule to democratic rule (Hanlon 2001). Democratic 
governments have a mandate to serve their constituencies. Corruption, however, 
undermines the promotion of democratic citizenship and inclusivity, thereby 
reducing accountability and transparency in the political constituency. The poor 
and marginalised in society trust public institutions, such as health and financial 
institutions, to serve their interests. When trust is undermined, democratic 
participation is curtailed, thereby instilling fear in citizens to participate. 
Corrupt governments become sources of insecurity to their citizens and hurt 
the development of nascent democratic institutions. Political elites can therefore 
buy justice, as judicial institutions become accountable to the interests of the 
dominant elite. Mozambique’s governance trajectory as a result of political and 
economic reforms has become aid-dependent and has paved avenues where 
corruption has become endemic. Aid-dependency has meant that Mozambican 
officials are accountable to donors, more than to their constituencies (Phiri 
2012). It can be argued then that aid has an endemic character of undermining 
the very same constituencies and political and economic institutions it purports 
to build. 
There are deficiencies when governments become predatory and fail to reduce 
corruption. Social change and progress take place in societies that uphold the 
rule of law, allowing space for the nascent development of inclusive political 
and economic institutions that, over time, do not exclude the citizenry (Mafeje 
2002; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In Mozambique, corruption is a complex 
problem. This can be attributed to a parasitic relationship that involves donors, 
the government, and the people. At the height of neo-liberal reforms, FRELIMO’s 
relinquishment of its socialist experiment accompanied by its accession into the 
aid-for-development domain has not only fostered opportunity for corruption, 
but also resulted in western policy dominance, which intensified the role of 
the ruling elites in Mozambique (Phiri 2012). In addition, acknowledging the 
simple premise that aid is typically released from one government to another 
government or from an international institution to a government, the ruling 
elite from the recipient country has a fictitious control over the ‘contribution’. 
The donor has a considerable degree of political manoeuvre over the country’s 
policy, and the people ultimately suffer the consequences. 
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Paolo di Renzio and Joseph Hanlon echo this sentiment as they assert that 
the government and the donor community arrived at a modus vivendi where 
state policy was guided by IFIs and donors with little to no sensibility towards 
national development. This has led to what di Renzio and Hanlon (2007:5) 
have termed ‘pathological equilibrium as large-scale corruption is unchecked’. 
Plank (1993:413) poignantly pointed out that this pumping of funds into 
Mozambique, accompanied by a proliferation of a fairly new private sector 
primarily led by political elites, opened the doors for public officials and 
ex-combatants who were not content with their earnings to collect ‘rents’. 
Whereas effective policies to reduce social ills are supposed to be carried out by 
the state, the parasitic relationship becomes more apparent as public and social 
institutions are incapacitated to make social change possible. Corruption thus 
unmasks Mozambique’s success story.
According to Hanlon (2009:1), ‘elite capitalism’, which he referred to as economic 
activities of certain Mozambican leaders, including current president Guebuza, 
has been discernible since the first decade of the 21st century. It certainly 
has a destructive effect on democratisation given its dependence on lack of 
transparency and lack of accountability for the citizenry. This system of elite 
capitalism is set to maintain its beneficiaries in the most privileged positions 
and ensure the eternal multiplication of trans-generational gains. As a result, 
inequalities are reproduced; the voices of the vast disadvantaged majority get 
put on mute as they hold little to no political or economic power, which hurts 
attempts to build an inclusive democracy. Hanlon (2009:7) substantiates the 
political and economic immortality of ruling elites when he reports: 
Guebuza’s children and relatives have interests in various companies, 
often in participation with other children of the elite, and are involved in 
telecommunications, mining, construction, tourism, environmental issues, 
petrol stations, and a new grain terminal; several consultancy companies 
have also been established. Armando Guebuza is also a shareholder of some 
of them, particularly through the family company Focus 21. 
Given this background, it is unsurprising that Guebuza has sought re-election 
in FRELIMO structures – mimicking Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian 
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presidency and further confirming the characterisation of Mozambique as a 
‘managed democracy’. According to Africa Confidential (2012:10), ‘the expected 
pattern in FRELIMO is that changing the leadership involves a realignment of 
power inside the party and a redistribution of the resulting benefits of patronage’. 
The Guebuza plan would leave many of those benefits where they are, in the 
hands of his family and associates, shutting out other FRELIMO members 
(Africa Confidential 2012:10). President Guebuza’s manipulation of political 
and economic institutions has cemented rebellion and battle for leadership 
succession as well as public discontent into his election. This further confirms 
what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012:430) have argued:
… the ability of those who dominate extractive institutions to benefit 
greatly at the expense of the rest of society implies that political power 
under extractive institutions is highly coveted, making many groups and 
individuals fight to obtain it. As a consequence there will be powerful forces 
pushing societies under extractive institutions toward political instability.
FRELIMO has maintained an iron grip on the succession battles within party 
structures, ensuring that the ruling politburo retains control of political and 
economic institutions and capital, policy initiatives and its own inside ‘dialogue’. 
Hanlon and Cunguara (2010) suggest that FRELIMO and the ruling oligarchs 
have strategically positioned themselves to benefit from the drivers of growth 
like Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), mega projects resulting from the natural 
resources boom and the mythology of donors promoting the ‘success story’. 
FRELIMO thereby runs a bifurcated state that maintains a parasitic relationship 
that feeds corruption, nepotism, clientelism and abuse of public funds. Hanlon 
further argues that ‘governance’ is presently seen as opening Mozambique to 
transnational corporations, while closing off domestic capital investment which 
has been important in all successful national developments, such as the Asian 
Tigers (Hanlon and Mosse 2010). 
Conclusion
Post-conflict peace in Mozambique paved a way for democratisation, allowing 
the new government to champion political pluralism and a move toward building 
an inclusive society and social justice. International stakeholders played a crucial 
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role in bringing peace, under the auspices of a liberal peace agenda. As a result of 
a negotiated democratic transition FRELIMO won the elections in 1994 and has 
subsequently continued to win, though with questionable results. The political 
space has been filled with the rhetoric of contestation, as RENAMO has attempted 
to position itself as a robust opposition. The new democratic movement, MDM, 
has asserted itself as a strong political contestant to FRELIMO, particularly at 
the local level. Also, the high level of dependency of civil society organisations 
on external financial and leadership assistance undermines efforts aimed at 
promoting political inclusiveness through the participation of the citizenry 
in policy processes. In the past decade, Mozambique’s political economy has 
depended on FDI and donors who in different ways have weakened the state 
apparatus. Internationally, this paints the picture of an increasingly democratic 
emerging economy opening its doors to business that multiply capital and 
eventually foster economic growth as prescribed by the policy dictates of 
Western governments, donors, and multilateral institutions.
Looking at Mozambique from the West, the idea of the ‘success story’ 
conveniently lives. In reality, the Mozambican democratic picture has a 
question mark as the dominant party and a considerable part of its members 
have distanced themselves from political, economic and strategic dialogue with 
other parties and the public, given the almost invisible line between FRELIMO 
and state apparatus. Elite capitalism and party dominance over state affairs 
caricature Mozambique as a ‘managed democracy’. To the detriment of ordinary 
citizens, the Mozambican post-conflict democratic government has maintained 
or reproduced extractive political and economic institutions that debilitate 
the development of an inclusive society and social justice. Political plurality 
has not been guarded in this new democracy. The analysis so far highlights 
that Mozambique has become a ‘managed democracy’. Mozambique’s peace 
agreement remains fragile, and the question is raised whether post-conflict 
democratisation has been inclusive for the poor and marginalised. 
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